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The authors consider the core areas of 
Lithuanian foreign policy. Special attention is 
paid to the adjustment of the major foreign 
policy vector, which concentrated earlier on 
the cooperation with the United States of 
America and strategic partnership with the 
Republic of Poland. The article analyses the 
attempts of Lithuanian president Dalia Gry-
bauskaitė to formulate the so-called «new 
foreign policy» based on the multivector ap-
proach to the intergovernmental cooperation. 
This research is timely because of an in-
creasing influence of small states on foreign 
policy decision-making within the European 
Union. It emphasizes the need to analyse fo-
reign policy priorities of the Baltic States and 
Central and Eastern European countries and 
to identify the dominant trends in the interna-
tional policy in the region in order to forecast 
further development at European and global 
levels. This objective is achieved with the help 
of an integrated approach with elements of 
interdisciplinary research. Special attention 
is paid to the comparative-historical ap-
proach, which facilitates the analysis of the 
relations between the Republic of Lithuania 
and the neighbouring states and its principal 
partners. Alongside traditional methods of 
historical research, this work employs such 
methods as participant observation, content 
and event analysis, and simultaneous and 
comparative analysis. 
The research and practical significance 
of this work is explained by its emphasis on 
the need to apply an additional theoretical 
framework to studies into the foreign policy 
initiatives of the Republic of Lithuania in the 
international arena. While earlier they were 
determined by the value (democratic ap-
proach), which was a reflection of American 
realism, today an increasingly important fac-
tor is the personality of the president, who 
does not always positively influence the chan-
ging policy of the country. The results of the 
research contribute substantially to the un-
derstanding of foreign policy processes taking 
place in Lithuania and the region in general. 
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The assumption of power by D. Grybauskaitė in 2009 was considered by 
many analysts as an opportunity for Vilnius to reconsider its traditional fo-
reign policy priorities based on the principles of pro-Americanism, globa-
lism, and Russophobia. Lithuanian politicians were also driven by the new 
geopolitical situation in Europe and the world: the foreign policy concepts of 
the principal strategic partners of the Republic of Lithuania (RL) changed, 
which deprived the latter of an important foothold in tackling global interna-
tional issues as well as hope to gain support in protecting national interests. 
Thus, challenged by these circumstances, D. Grybauskaitė was forced to de-
velop a “new foreign policy”. 
According to the current president, the problems and vulnerability of 
Lithuania stemmed from the fact that the country “had a single vector fo-
reign policy — “either the USA, or no one”. Today I hope to make a turn 
towards a multi-vector foreign policy, so that it has several vectors:  USA as 
a guarantor of security, and Europe will find us on the map, especially its 
North as our priority, our neighbours. Thus, I aspire, to bring about equilib-
rium; but it will take some time, and such changes cannot be rapid” [1]. 
Since Grybauskaitė was prone to abandon the classical principles of 
identifying the priorities of Lithuanian foreign policy, the expert community 
expected something of a revolution in the field of foreign policy. In 2010, 
the president declared that “this year will be a year of establishing my fo-
reign policy priorities” [2]. However, Grybauskaitė’s 2010 annual report 
showed that she would not produce a radical change in the field of foreign 
policy. Moreover, all in all, everything said in the report followed the con-
cept developed as early as 2004 (further EU and NATO integration and good 
relations with neighbours) and did not suggest anything new [3]. Thus, the 
2010 and 2011 annual reports of the president, which paid limited attention 
to foreign policy issues, produced an ambiguous reaction among political 
observers. Today is has become obvious that Grybauskaitė faced both the 
absence of a coherent team (emphasized by the resignation of the Lithuanian 
foreign minister, Vygaudas Ušackas, in January 2010), and the problem of 
forming a clear foreign policy course (Lithuanian ex-foreign minister Ušack-
as even called Grybauskaitė’s foreign policy “vectorless”) [4]. Without sug-
gesting a viable alternative, or a succession strategy, the president’s foreign 
policy has been sharply criticised recently for the lack of clear priorities that 
can be shared by the political elite of the country. 
Over a long period of time, the principal strategic partner of Lithuania 
was the United States of America. The first steps Grybauskaitė took showed 
that her foreign policy would not follow V. Adamkus’s pro-American tradi-
tion. For example, once, having called Lithuania a “hostage” of the US poli-
cy, Grybauskaitė added: “the USA is still our important partner in the field 
of security and in the framework of NATO, but Lithuania will not be an im-
plement of the US or Russian foreign policy. Lithuania will carry out its own 
foreign policy” [5]. 
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Moreover, at the initial stage of her presidential term, D. Grybauskaitė 
refused to attend a dinner organised by Barack Obama in Prague, having sent 
the prime minister to replace her. In the interview to the Austrian newspaper 
Die Presse, D. Grybauskaitė openly questioned the actions of the western 
coalition in Libya, stressing that they went beyond the UN mandate [6]. 
However, political experts believe that for RL, as a member of the UN and a 
close ally of the USA supporting the idea of transatlantic unity, it is irre-
sponsible to make such statements. 
Summing up the issue of Vilnius policy towards the USA, one can say 
that the general background of Lithuanian-American relations has turned 
from positive to tense which poses a threat to their strategic character. At the 
same time, the connections with “old Europe” did not reach a new level. In 
July 2010, the famous Lithuanian political observer, R. Valatka wrote, “Ber-
lin, Paris, and Moscow want to drive a wedge between Lithuania and the 
USA, and Lithuania had to abandon its foreign policy, and that is what did 
happen” [7]. The strongest criticism against D. Grybauskaitė focuses in this 
case on the fact that, having broken away from the USA, she has not yet of-
fered a strategic alternative. 
Similarly controversial (and almost conflict) situation has been deve-
loping within the relations between Lithuania and Poland. The problem is 
the national minority in the Vilnius region and the RL in general. The Polish 
are not satisfied with the fact that they cannot write their names in IDs and 
the names of streets in the areas of dense settlement of the national minority 
in the Polish language. Moreover, they also oppose the Law on education for 
the national minority schools, according to which the students of non-
Lithuanian schools will have to take the same level Lithuanian language ex-
amination as Lithuanians from 2013, and certain subjects (first of all, history 
and geography) will be Lithuanised. At the same time it is evident that, as a 
strategic partner, Poland is more important for Lithuania than Lithuania for 
Poland. First of all, today the Republic of Poland is a priority partner of the 
USA in Europe. Thus, close ties with Warsaw can give the Republic of Lith-
uania an opportunity to draw the attention of the USA to its problems and 
vice versa. Secondly, Poland is a “big” European state that has greater influ-
ence in Europe that the RL. In other words, through loosing Poland, Lithua-
nia loses an important partner and the influence in the EU and NATO. Third-
ly, Lithuania needs Poland to participate in the construction of a NPP in its 
territory and the creation of a “power bridge” between the states. But if the 
relations between the countries deteriorate further, Poland may decide to 
construct a NPP on its own and/or collaborate in this field with Russia, 
which builds a NPP in the Kaliningrad region (mass media disclosed the in-
formation on Russian-Polish negotiations about the purchase of power gen-
erated by the Baltic NPP). 
Thus, Lithuania taking a strict position regarding the Polish minority, 
acts unwisely. At the same time, the position of the Polish foreign minister, 
R. Sikorski, who expects first steps from Lithuania, is absolutely logical [8]. 
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However, the foreign minister of Lithuania, Audronius Ažubalis, when 
commenting on the Polish residing in the RL fighting for their rights, said 
that national minorities should not become hostages to short-sighted populist 
games, heated up by a „third party“ [9]. 
Thus, the potential of Lithuanian-Polish relations accumulated under  
V. Adamkus, has been exhausted, and the irrational “stubbornness” of Lithu-
ania may have serious strategic repercussions. 
The position of Vilnius towards the post-Soviet countries, the relations 
with which were a trademark of the ex-president Valdas Adamkus, has 
changed noticeably. Under V. Adamkus, Lithuania actively cooperated with 
Georgia and Ukraine in the framework of the US strategy of bringing de-
mocracy to the East aimed at their rapid Euro-Atlantic integration. This po-
sition can be either supported or opposed, but it was clear and consistent. As 
D. Grybauskaitė assumed power, the situation changed, which was heralded 
by a phrase ascribed to the president: “We sign partnership agreements with 
the poverty-stricken, and confront the decision-makers” [10]. Apparently, as 
a result, Georgia and Ukraine were forgotten by Vilnius as significant part-
ners. Another misunderstanding was Lithuanian policy towards Belarus, 
which was not free from president’s idiosyncrasies. Belarus is important for 
Lithuania, at least, because it ranked first in terms of transhipment through 
the Klaipeda port in 2010 [11]. Moreover, Vilnius has always seen itself as a 
mediator between the EU and Minsk. Thus, when the attitude of the EU to-
wards Belarus started to change (for the better, in the context of its increa-
sing confrontation with Moscow), Lithuania found itself in the vanguard of 
establishing ties with Minsk. Just remember the mutual visits of the presi-
dents of the two countries! It gave rise to negotiations on the construction of 
a liquefied natural gas terminal in Lithuania and the shipment of Venezuelan 
oil to Belarus through Klaipeda. However, soon D. Grybauskaitė’s pragma-
tism went beyond the EU values. As Reuters reports, at a meeting with Eu-
ropean diplomats she said that A. Lukashenko was a guarantor of economic 
and political stability, as well as Belarusian independence [12]. The Lithu-
anian approach proved to be unwise, as a result of which the RL lost its face 
having relied on A. Lukashenko’s promises too much. 
Finally, let us focus on Russia. It is worth noting that the outer animosity 
of Lithuania towards Moscow decreased as D. Grybauskaitė assumed power, 
but the relations between the two countries did not get off the ground. An is-
sue that is worth paying special attention to is the Lithuanian perspective on 
the Baltic NPP. V. Putin invited Lithuania in the person of its president to 
participate in this project, but D. Grybauskaitė refused categorically [13]. 
The issue is complex, especially, in the context of the interests of Lithuanian 
energy security and its plans to construct the Visaginas NPP. However, a 
categorical position is not the best decision in this case. As the president of 
Lithuania, A. Grybauskaitė must minister to the needs of Lithuanian citizens, 
who are reluctant to pay three times as much for power. The Visaginas NPP, 
if it is constructed anyway, will not be able to guarantee low prices. Thus, 
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“burning the bridges” with Russia in the context of cooperation in the 
framework of the Baltic NPP project (even if limited to power transit) is, at 
least, unwise. K. Prunskienė is considered in Lithuania an openly pro-Rus-
sian politician. However, she was right to say that “Lithuania did not even 
discuss this Russian proposition… The decision to such an important for 
Lithuania issue as an increase of energy potential of the Baltic region and the 
connection to Western European power networks without losing the establi-
shed connections with Russia and Belarus is feasible and will make it possi-
ble to supply the country with cheaper power. Alas, people are still being 
scared with the chimera of the Russian threat, which we cannot get rid of and 
which has truly done service to the conservatives and mass media as a means 
of intimidation” [14]. Finally, D. Grybauskaitė expressed her support for the 
minister of energy, A. Sekmokas, who confronts Gazprom and for whom the 
opposition organised a failed interpellation. First of all, the Russian gas mo-
nopolist is dissatisfied with the fact that Lithuania chose the most radical 
variant of meeting the requirements of the third EU energy package aimed at 
separating the gas supplied from the distribution infrastructure. To a great 
extent, it is the reason why Gazprom refuses to lower gas prices for Lithua-
nia, but the president of the country — through supporting a “contentious” 
minister emphasizes that she is not bothered by this circumstance. In view of 
the negative tendencies, one is prone to believe that it will be quite difficult 
to improve the relations with Russia. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The assumption of power by D. Grybauskaitė in Lithuania gave rise to 
many expectations — both in the field of internal political regulation and the 
overcoming the large-scale economic and social crisis deteriorated by the in-
creasing social unrest and foreign policy. 
The president demonstrated the qualities of a tough and principled leader 
right after the inauguration, accompanied by a considerable shuffle within 
public authorities, chief prosecutor’s office, judicial system, and the structu-
res of State Security Department. However, she did not only meet the ex-
pectations of Lithuanian citizens, but also caused understandable anxiety 
among the elite. Moreover, Grybauskaitė dared to question the significance 
for modern Lithuania of ex-president Adamkus’s foreign policy, which was 
based on cooperation with the USA supported by joint military operations in 
the framework of implementing American strategic interests. Having aban-
doned the single-vector foreign policy, Grybauskaitė focused her political 
efforts on the formation of a pro-European component of Lithuanian foreign 
policy. Today the bulk of criticism against Grybauskaitė stems from the fact 
that having abandoned the classical principles of Lithuanian foreign policy 
she failed to offer an alternative foreign policy strategy clear for the political 
elite of the country. The national security of Lithuania and its foreign policy 
are in direct correlation with the relations with three external figures — the 
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Russian Federation, the United States of America and the Republic of Po-
land. The last two years have seen considerable cooling in relations with the 
USA and Poland, which can pose a problem to the successful implementa-
tion of Lithuanian own national interests and objectives. The situation is de-
teriorated by the improbability of normalization of relations with Russia un-
der the conditions of the ongoing restructuring of energy sector and an open 
opposition with Gazprom. After the presidential elections of 2010 one could 
not rely on close cooperation with Belarus either. 
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